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Abstract
Since the second half of the past century, increasingly flexible organizational
forms are appearing among firms. However, while hierarchies are easily described,
too few mathematical tools are available for flexible organizations.
In this article, two measures are proposed in order to assess the state and trend
of flexible organizations. The first of these measures is based on information waste,
which occurs whenever information is classified into categories. The second mea-
sure is based on duplication of operations.
The underlying idea is that firms have an endogenous drive towards organi-
zational configurations where waste of information and duplication of operations
are minimized. However, environmental uncertainty may require some flexibility,
which is ensured by cognitive processes that discard some information as well as
by parallel undertaking of similar actions.
Both cognitive processes and parallel action are firm-specific features that only
make sense within the knowledge-based view of the firm. However, in the special
case where information waste and duplication of operations reach zero a firm can
be described as an information processor, as contractualist views prescribe.
JEL: D23, L20
Keywords: Flexible organizations, New organizational forms, Theory of the Firm
1 Introduction
Since several decades, many firms are shifting towards structures that are ever more
flexible, decentralized, reticular or otherwise defined but, in some sense, different from
classical hierarchies [20]. Possibly, even the classical shift from functional to multidi-
visional structures may be interpreted as a part of this secular trend [5]. Wherever its
origin may be dated back, this process clearly accelerated since the 1980s, giving rise
to a series of buzzwords such as “kanban system”, “teamwork”, “production islands”,
“flat structures”, “network firm” and others more or less directly related to the idea of
increasing flexibility.
Henceforth, the expression “flexible organization” will be used to capture organi-
zational forms that, under some respect, depart from bureaucracies. This article takes
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the stand that, beyond the many managerial fads and myths surrounding flexibility and
flexible organizations, a real trend towards flexibility does exist.
According to many observers, a trend of this kind is mainly due to increasing en-
vironmental unpredictability induced by increasing variety of tastes and products [14].
Indeed, firms operating in predictable environments escaped the general trend — a
good example being that of large companies operating in the mining sector that never
switched to the multidivisional structure [9].
In any case, increasing flexibility should not be seen as a compelling trend for all
firms. It is clear that, although some firms are developing highly decentralized and
flexible forms, others just softened the bureaucratic procedures that they had adopted
in the 1960s and 1970s, while still others are by no means affected by the rush towards
flexibility. One may conclude that albeit a trend does exist, this does not imply a radical
transformation of all firms but rather the emergence of a novel organizational form that
will possibly coexist with the previous ones.
This novel organizational form rejects a classical prescription of organization the-
ory, namely, that the productive core of a firm should be isolated from all unpredictable
environmental variability [36]. Rather than buffering disturbances by means of inven-
tories and standardized procedures, these firms accept that unpredictable signals enter
their daily operations in order to exploit market niches — for instance, a firm may care
for customizations and dedicated production lots in order to serve particular needs.
It is obvious that a firm that sets out to exploit an unpredictable environment must
entail a wider array of behavioral patterns than a firm designed to cope with a stable
and predictable environment. Furthermore, Ashby’s principle of requisite variety may
suggest that the array of behavioral patterns of such a firm should be even larger than
that of the environment itself [3].
These quite general considerations suggest that firms characterized by a flexible
organization should exhibit both a high cognitive ability, in order to understand novel
situations, and a substantial innovative ability, in order to cope with novel situations.
These two features may be expressed as follows:
1. A flexible firm must be able to understand and adapt to novel situations. There-
fore, it must be able to classify a huge amount of information into categories,
adapt its categories to the changing environment and develop proper patterns of
action. Since classification implies that slightly different pieces of information
are considered as equivalent to one another, information classification implies
that some information is wasted in the process.
2. A flexible firm must be able to explore novel arrangements of its assets in order
to satisfy novel needs. Thus, it must be able to try novel combinations and se-
quencings of its operations. Since by doing so it may occur that different parts
of the firm explore the same combination and sequencing of operations, some
unnecessary duplication of operations may take place.
The above issues regard (1) a firm’s ability to recognize the relevant features of an
unpredictable environment, and (2) its ability to explore appropriate reactions. Thus,
they constitute sensible and valuable characteristics.
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However, both of them have drawbacks. In fact, with respect to a firm operating
in a predictable environment it appears that a firm capable of recognizing novelties
and developing appropriate responses may (1) waste too much information, and (2)
duplicate too many operations.
Thus, under these respects the firms operating in unpredictable environments are
less efficient than firms operating in predictable environments. Provided that firms
seek efficiency, it follows that firms have a tendency to reduce information waste and
duplication of operations, though the unpredictability of their environment may pre-
vent them from reaching a state where no information is wasted and no operation is
duplicated.
Thus, information waste and duplication of operations may play for the study of
organizational forms a similar role as utility and profit functions in economics [8], fit-
ness functions in evolutionary theory, gravitational and electrical potential functions in
physics. All of them are Lyapunov functions (see Appendix A) describing the tendency
of a system towards a stable equilibrium state.
Lyapunov functions describe a tendency that is not necessarily followed, but that
nevertheless exerts a pressure pointing to a stable equilibrium. So microeconomics
depicts firms as profit maximizers, evolutionary theory depicts species as fitness max-
imizers and physics describes falling bodies as potential minimizers; however, firms
may not reach maximum profit because of management inefficiencies, exogenous con-
straints or other reasons, species may not reach maximum fitness because some evolu-
tionary jumps may be unlikely or impossible, and some falling bodies may be impaired
from reaching the soil by forces acting in the opposite direction. The existence of a Lya-
punov function does not imply that the stable equilibrium will necessarily be reached
before the system undergoes a transformation that changes the equilibrium itself. It
just ensures that a tendency towards that equilibrium exists.
The current trend towards flexible organizations is generally interpreted as due to
the fact that the environments where firms operate become ever less predictable with
respect to managerial capabilities. Coherence with this interpretation implies that the
natural tendency acts in the opposite direction, i.e. towards rigid, perfectly planned
organizations where no information is wasted and no operations are duplicated. If the
opposite trend is observed, this can only be due to increasingly unpredictable environ-
ments coupled with the bounded rationality of decision-makers. Thus, we set out to
characterize flexibility by means of Lyapunov functions that express natural tendencies
that operate when the environment is predictable, but that can be offset if the environ-
ment becomes unpredictable.
Consider the classical case of Toyota, which in the 1980s was able to develop new
models faster than any American or Japanese competitor. Allegedly [38], this happened
because within this firm (i) technical specifications fluctuated within broad ranges that
were narrowed as late as possible (broad categories that waste a large amount of infor-
mation), and (ii) a large number of alternative projects was carried out at the same time
(duplication of operations).
However, the success of Toyota cannot be ascribed to greater information waste
and greater duplication of operations in themselves, but to greater environmental un-
predictability making information waste and duplication of operations costly but valu-
able features. This implicitly means that its U.S. competitors had actually achieved a
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higher degree of structural optimality with respect to an environment that was supposed
to be stable but, alas, started to change in unpredictable ways. In a more predictable
environment, such as those prevailing in the 1960s, flexibility was useless. According
to the proposed interpretation the fact that at Toyota technical specifications fluctuated
and several alternative projects were carried out at the same time is not good in itself,
but had the advantage of enabling greater flexibility.
The idea underlying this article is that, since wasting information and duplicating
operations are not good things by themselves, a tendency exists in all organizations to
minimize them. However, the stable equilibrium where no information is wasted and no
operation is duplicated can only be reached if the environment is perfectly predictable,
for only if its environment is perfectly predictable a firm can afford not to be flexible
at all. In general, the less predictable the environment, the more information is wasted,
the more operations are duplicated, and the more flexible the organization.
If these two Lyapunov functions provide a valuable synthetic description of the dis-
tance of flexible organizational forms from the ideal organization of a firm operating in
a predictable environment, then they can be used to compare alternative organizational
forms and to evaluate their performance across environments. Similarly to compar-
isons of levels of utility and levels of profits, they may enable a comparative statics of
organizational forms.
The ensuing section 2 defines and expounds the two proposed measures of flexibil-
ity. Section 3 sketches their possible application to numerical and empirical examples.
Finally, section 4 frames this formalism with respect to the theories of the firm.
2 Two Lyapunov Functions
Let us conceive a firm as composed by organizational units that may entail both men
and machines. Let us assume that each organizational unit is endowed with (1) a set
of categories to classify information, (2) a set of pieces of information to be produced,
and (3) a rule that specifies on what occasions a particular piece of information should
be produced.
The categories represent the situations that decision-makers endowed with partic-
ular machines are able to recognize. For instance, a press operator may recognize any
metal sheet as pertaining to him, whereas he would refuse paperwork as pertaining to
somebody else.
The rule specifies which operation an organizational unit should carry out when
certain situations are recognized. For instance our worker at the press, after recognizing
a metal sheet may put it under the press, activate it and obtain an object with the desired
shape.
The output of an organizational unit may be a physical object but also a piece of
software or a communication. In any case, it is perceived by the receiving unit as a
piece of information. For instance, for the press operator in the above example the
metal sheet entails the information “this sheet must be shaped”.
The above description of organizational units is quite general. The operations car-
ried out by an organizational unit consist of producing as output a piece of information
when a piece of information is received as input. The input information is classified by
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Figure 1: A category with two “don’t care” characters and the four information strings
that it classifies.
a category and the decision concerning which information should be issued as output
is made by means of a rule.
Taking inspiration from classifier systems [11] [12], let us represent both categories
and information by means of strings of characters that can be zeros, ones, or “don’t
care” characters #. 1 Henceforth we shall also employ the terms “category string” and
“information string”, respectively.
Category strings must entail at least one #-character. In fact, categories are strings
that match all information strings that have zeros and ones in the same positions where
they have zeros and ones, while it does not matter which character information strings
have where category strings have a #. For instance, the category string depicted in the
left half of figure 1 is able to classify the four information strings depicted in the right
half of the picture. One may also visualize a category string as a container that collects
all information strings that have zeros and ones in its same positions.
Information strings may have #-characters as well. In this case, #-characters repre-
sent the unpredictability of the corresponding information bit. Thus, if an information
string with a # is issued, this can only be classified by a category string that has a # in
the same position.
Let H denote the number of different category strings owned by all organizational
units of the firm. Let K denote the number of different information strings that can be
produced by all organizational units of the firm. Since categories are there in order to
classify information, it must be H < K.
Organizational units may be so simple to have just one category string and be able
to produce just one kind of category string. This may be e.g. the case of a specialized
machine, a worker on the conveyor belt, or a department in a strongly bureaucratic
organization.
In general, an organizational unit may own several categories, each of a different
kind, that enable it to process different information strings. This may be the case of a
machine that can be endowed with different tools, a worker with multiple skills, or a
problem-solving unit where different specialties are represented.
Connections between any two organizational units take place with varying fre-
quency depending on hierarchical relations, time required to carry out operations, relat-
1Classifier systems employ the terms “condition” and “action” where we said “category” and “informa-
tion”, respectively.
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edness of activities, patterns of acquaintance or else. If we assume that the connections
between any two organizational units only depend on what category strings they own
and what information strings they produce, then the structure of relationships within
the firm can be expressed by the probabilities that a category string of type h classifies
an information string of type k, ∀h = 1,2, . . .H and ∀k = 1,2, . . .K. Henceforth, let phk
denote the probability that a category string of type h classifies an information string
of type k.
The existence of a Lyapunov function implies that the operations carried out by
the units and the probabilities phk have a tendency towards an equilibrium configura-
tion. If the Lyapunov function rests on structural properties, this equilibrium state is
structurally optimal.
A firm can attain structural optimality if it finds itself in a predictable environment
and if its decision-makers are capable of making predictions. Henceforth, these con-
cepts will be used with the following meaning:
Predictability The environment of a firm is predictable if it behaves according to laws
that are known by the firm, and if these laws do not require unavailable data in
order to be applied.
Rationality Within a firm, decision-makers are rational if they make use of all avail-
able information to attain their goals.
Clearly, rational decision-makers and predictable environments are an abstraction.
These abstractions are made in order to claim that, if the environment is predictable and
the decision-makers are rational, then a firm tends to a stable equilibrium state where
no information is wasted and no operations are duplicated.
In the following two subsections, two Lyapunov functions will be introduced, that
describe the natural tendency of an organization to a state where no information is
wasted and no operation is duplicated. For the idea of defining Lyapunov functions to
describe the evolution of a decentralized economic system, Allais [1] has to be credited.
2.1 Information Waste
Let specicity denote the number of non-# characters in a string. Let sh denote the
specificity of category string h, where h = 1,2, . . .H, and let zk denote the specificity
of information string k, where k = 1,2, . . .K.
Let us define the information waste when the category string h classifies the infor-
mation string k as follows:
uhk = zk − sh (1)
Note that since zk ≥ sh, it follows that uhk ≥ 0.
The waste of information in the whole firm is the sum of the information wasted
at all connections. However, since connections occur with specific probabilities, the
addends of this sum must be weighted:
U = ∑
hk
phkuhk (2)
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If a firm starts with a structure S∗ and arrives at a structure S ∗, the corresponding
variation of information waste is ∆U :
∆U =
S∗
∑
Si=S∗
∆Ui (3)
where ∆Ui = U |Si −U |Si−1 and where the series of structures {Si} extends from S∗ to
S∗.
If ∆Ui < 0 for ∀i, then the organization has a spontaneous tendency to move from
structure S∗ to structure S ∗.
2.2 Operations Duplication
The operations carried out by an organizational unit are the procedures it follows in
order to produce an information string out of an input classified by one of its category
strings. However, we do not observe the functioning of organizational units, but only
the categories that they employ and the information that they produce. Thus, duplica-
tion of operations should be measured in these terms.
In order to consider the operations carried out by an organizational unit in terms of
the categories that it employs and the information that it produces, we must consider
chains of at least three units. Among two chains of three units, we can observe whether
their central units duplicate their operations in the sense that they employ the same
category string and produce the same information string.
Let us consider operations duplication by organizational units that classify infor-
mation by means of category strings of type h1 and produce information strings of type
k1. Let us consider chains of three organizational units that include the above units in
the middle. Let the stream of information be k → h1 7→ k1 → h, where k is the informa-
tion string produced by the first unit and h is the category string employed by the third
unit, the symbol “→” denotes a connection between two organizational units whilst
“7→” denotes the operations carried out by the central unit in the chain.
Duplication of the operations carried out by one organizational unit takes place if
two chains of three organizational units are linked by identical category strings and
identical information strings. The probability that two chains of three units duplicate
the operations of their central unit is:
v21 =
1
HK
H
∑
h,h1=1
K
∑
k,k1=1
(phk1 ph1k)
2 (4)
where coefficient 1/HK ensures that 0 ≤ v21 ≤ 1.
Likewise, the probability that three chains of three units triplicate the operations of
their central unit is:
v31 =
1
HK
H
∑
h,h1=1
K
∑
k,k1=1
(phk1 ph1k)
3 (5)
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These terms entail a geometric series of ratio ∑Hh,h1=1 ∑
K
k,k1=1(phk1 ph1k). So if in the
organization there are m units that duplicate operations within chains of three units, the
sum of this series is:
v1(m) =
1
HK
H
∑
h,h1=1
K
∑
k,k1=1
(phk1 ph1k)
2
1−
(
∑Hh,h1=1 ∑
K
k,k1=1 phk1 ph1k
)m
1−∑Hh,h1=1 ∑
K
k,k1=1 phk1 ph1k
(6)
provided that ∑Hh,h1=1 ∑
K
k,k1=1(phk1 ph1k) 6= 1.
If ∑Hh,h1=1 ∑
K
k,k1=1(phk1 ph1k) < 1 and if m is sufficiently large, the above value can
be approximated by its asymptotic limit for m → ∞:
v1 =
1
HK
∑Hh,h1=1 ∑
K
k,k1=1(phk1 ph1k)
2
1−∑Hh,h1=1 ∑
K
k,k1=1 phk1 ph1k
(7)
The above expressions refer to chains of three organizational units where the op-
erations carried out by the central unit are duplicated, triplicated, and so on. We may
consider duplication of the operations carried out by a chain of two organizational
units, included in a chain of four units. In this case, the stream of information would
be k → h1 7→ k1 → h2 7→ k2 → h, where k is the information string produced by the first
unit, h1 and k1 are, respectively, the category string and the information string of the
second unit, h2 and k2 are, respectively, the category string and the information string
of the third unit, and h is the category string employed by the fourth and last unit.
The probability that two or more chains of four organizational units duplicate op-
erations is:
v22 =
1
HK
H
∑
h,h1,h2=1
K
∑
k,k1,k2=1
(phk1 ph1k2 ph2k)
2 (8)
where, again, coefficient 1/HK ensures that 0 ≤ v22 ≤ 1.
As above, we may consider triplication, quadruplication, and so on. The ensuing
series is geometric of ratio ∑Hh,h1,h2=1 ∑
K
k,k1,k2=1 phk1 ph1k2 ph2k and, as above, its sum to
the m-th order is:
v2(m)=
1
HK
H
∑
h,h1,h2=1
K
∑
k,k1,k2=1
(phk1 ph1k2 ph2k)
2
1−
(
∑Hh,h1,h2=1 ∑
K
k,k1,k2=1 phk1 ph1k2 ph2k
)m
1−∑Hh,h1,h2=1 ∑
K
k,k1,k2=1 phk1 ph1k2 ph2k
(9)
provided that ∑Hh,h1,h2=1 ∑
K
k,k1,k2=1 phk1 ph1k2 ph2k 6= 1.
As above, the limit of this sum for m → ∞ is:
v2 =
1
HK
∑Hh,h1,h2=1 ∑
K
k,k1,k2=1(phk1 ph1k2 ph2k)
2
1−∑Hh,h1,h2=1 ∑
K
k,k1,k2=1 phk1 ph1k2 ph2k
(10)
provided that ∑Hh,h1,h2=1 ∑
K
k,k1,k2=1 phk1 ph1k2 ph2k < 1.
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The more units are involved, the less likely it is that duplication of operations oc-
curs. Thus {v1,v2, . . .} is a decreasing series, whose generic n-th term takes the form:
vn =
1
HK
∑Hh,h1,...hn=1 ∑
K
k,k1,...kn=1(phk1 ph1k2 . . . phn−1kn phnk)
2
∑Hh,h1,...hn=1 ∑
K
k,k1,...kn=1 phk1 ph1k2 . . . phn−1kn phnk
(11)
In the end, in a firm with multiple paths up to order N we can measure the extent
of operations duplication by means of:
V =
N
∑
n=1
vn (12)
Similarly to equation (3), we can say that if a firm starts with a structure S∗ and
arrives at a structure S ∗, the corresponding variation of operations duplication is ∆V :
∆V =
S∗
∑
Si=S∗
∆Vi (13)
where ∆Vi = V |Si −V |Si−1 and where the series of structures {Si} extends from S∗ to
S∗.
If ∆Vi < 0 for ∀i, then the organization has a spontaneous tendency to move from
structure S∗ to structure S ∗.
3 Applications
This sections illustrates the meaning of the Lyapunov functions defined above by means
of two examples. The first one concerns a stylized comparison between a flexible
organization and a hierarchy according to quite a common scheme in the literature. The
second one is excerpted from a real case of a firm that, after switching from a classical
hierarchy to an extreme form of flexible organization, decreased its level of flexibility
at a later stage. In this case, lack of empirical information makes it impossible to apply
the equations derived above, but the situation is suggestive of their meaning.
3.1 Hierarchy vs. Multihierarchy
A number of comparisons between hierarchies and flexible organizations were prompted
by the superior performance of many Japanese firms with respect to their American
competitors during the 1980s. Soon, this became a canonical topic in organization sci-
ence. Western investigators pointed to communication between marketing people and
engineers, personnel rotation and flexible teams composed by people from different
departments as key factors of the success of Japanese firms. 2
2Subsequent investigations yielded a much richer, often different picture of Japanese-style manufacturing.
However, here the issue is that of comparing idealized structures that have been widely discussed in the
literature.
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Figure 2: In the “Western” hierarchy on the left, units (b) and (c) rely on information
issued by (d) and (e), respectively. In the “Japanese” multihierarchy on the right, units
(b) and (c) rely on information issued by both (d) and (e).
Following this interpretation, Japanese-style firms have been characterized as pol-
yarchies, or multihierarchies, i.e. structures where cross-connections between depart-
ments originate from superimposition of multiple hierarchies [33] [34] [35] [2]. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates the difference between hierarchies and multihierarchies in a highly
simplified setting. Both structures entail a commanding unit (a) (the boss) and two
functional units (b) and (c) (e.g. engineering and marketing) that process information
stemming from two sources (d) and (e) (e.g. technological constraints and market sur-
veys). Contrary to the simple hierarchy, the multihierarchy forces engineers to take
account of aesthetical aspects and marketeers to take account of technical aspects.
Let us compute potential functions U and V for the hierarchy and the multihier-
archy of figure 2. If a firm is endowed with rational managers and if it operates in a
predictable environment, it should move to the structure that has lower U and lower V .
Since in the hierarchy each organizational unit receives information from only one
other unit and passes on information to only one other unit, each organizational unit has
its specific category string and information string, which we may label with numbers
following alphabetical ordering. So unit (a) has a category string labelled with h = 1
and issues an information string labelled with k = 1, unit (b) has a category string
labelled with h = 2 and issues an information string labelled with k = 2, and so on.
On the contrary, in the multihierarchy units (b) and (c) must be endowed with
similar category strings in order to be able to process both the information strings
issued by (d) and the information strings issued by (e). One possibility is that (b) and
(c) are endowed with one category each, but one with a large number of #-characters
— i.e. that they become generalists. In this case units (b) and (c) are endowed with the
same category strings and produce the same information strings, that are different from
those they had in the hierarchy. Another possibility is that (b) and (c) are endowed
with two categories each, i.e. that each of them acquires the skills of two specialties.
In this case each unit has a different pair of category strings, but may produce the same
information string as in the hierarchy.
We shall consider three organizational configurations: the hierarchy, the multihier-
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Hierarchy Multihierarchy (g) Multihierarchy (s)
unit h k h k h k
a 1 1 1 1 1 1
b 2 2 6 6 7, 8 2
c 3 3 6 6 9, 10 3
d 4 4 4 4 4 4
e 5 5 5 5 5 5
Table 1: The codification of category strings and information strings for the hierarchy,
the multihierarchy with generalists (g) and the multihierarchy with multi-skilled spe-
cialists (s). Codifications departing from those of the hierarchy have been highlighted.
archy with generalists and the multihierarchy with multi-skilled specialists. Lyapunov
functions U and V will be computed in all three cases, and comparisons will be made
between the hierarchy and each of the two versions of the multihierarchy.
Table (1) illustrates the codification of category strings and information strings in
these three configurations. In the hierarchy, each unit has a category string and issues
an information string denoted by a number corresponding to the name of that unit. In
the multihierarchy with generalists, units (b) and (c) have the same category string,
denoted by h = 6, and produce the same information string, denoted by k = 6. For
simplicity it is assumed that the category string of unit (a) is still able to capture the
information strings issued by (b) and (c). In the multihierarchy with specialists, units
(b) and (c) have two category strings each, denoted by h = 7, h = 8 and h = 9, h = 10,
respectively. However, they produce the same information strings as in the hierarchy.
Let us compute information waste U . The connections between (a) and (b) and
between (a) and (c) are characterized by the same amount of information waste in the
hierarchy and in the multihierarchy with multi-skilled specialists. So far it regards the
multihierarchy with generalists, if we for simplicity assume that z6 = 1/2(z2 +z3), then
also in this case these connections contribute the same amount of information waste.
Thus, under this assumption the information waste contributed by the connections be-
tween (a) and (b) and between (a) and (c) can be ignored.
By applying equation (3) we find that hierarchy, multihierarchy with generalists and
multihierarchy with multi-skilled specialists are characterized by the following values
of information waste:
UH = p24(z4− s2)+ p35(z5− s3) (14)
UMHg = 2p64(z4− s6)+2p65(z5− s6) (15)
UMHs = p74(z4− s7)+ p85(z5− s8)
+p95(z5− s9)+ p104(z4− s10) (16)
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Let us analyze the meaning of equations (14), (15) and (16). For simplicity, let us
assume that p24 = p35 = p64 = p65 = p74 = p85 = p95 = p104 so probability values
can be ignored altogether.
Let us consider the case of a multihierarchy with generalists. It is easy to see that
UMHg < UH , meaning that a firm has a tendency to switch from the hierarchical to the
multihierarchical structure if s6 > 1/4(s2 + s3 + z4 + z5), i.e. if the category string of
the two generalists in (b) and (c) is more specific than the average of the other strings
considered. This is nearly impossible because by definition z4 ≥ s2 and z5 ≥ s3 and,
furthermore, in order for h = 6 to be a generalist’s category it must be s6 ≤min{s2,s3}.
Thus, we must conclude that no spontaneous tendency exists for a firm to switch
from a hierarchical structure to a multihierarchical structure implemented by gener-
alists. This does not mean that such a shift may not occur if market unpredictability
forces a firm to do so, but that such a shift would take place at the expense of a greater
information waste. For instance, if the structure of figure (2) is interpreted in the sense
that unit (b) deals with engineering and unit (c) deals with marketing, implementing
the multihierarchy by means of generalists means that marketing is so basic that even
engineers can do it and that technology is so simple that even the marketing people can
understand it, which implies that the firm is unable to exploit the most sophisticated
market niches. Although environmental turbulence or other exogenous factors may
force a firm to do so, it makes sense that no spontaneous tendency exists for this move.
Let us consider the case of a multihierarchy with multi-skilled specialists. In this
case UMHs < UH , which means that a firm has a tendency to switch from the hierar-
chical to the multihierarchical structure if s7 + s8 + s9 + s10 > s2 + s3 + z4 + z5 which,
since by definition z4 ≥ s2 and z5 ≥ s3, implies s7 + s8 + s9 + s10 > 2(s2 + s3). Thus,
a spontaneous tendency towards a multihierarchy exists only if the category strings of
the multihierarchy, though obeying the requirements s7 ≤ z4, s7 ≤ z5, s8 ≤ z4, s8 ≤ z5,
s9 ≤ z4, s9 ≤ z5, s10 ≤ z4, s10 ≤ z5, are on average more specific than the category
strings of the hierarchy. If the structure of figure (2) is interpreted in the sense that
unit (b) deals with engineering and unit (c) deals with marketing, implementing the
multihierarchy by means of multi-skilled specialists means that the engineers acquire
a profound competence in marketing and that the marketing people acquire a profound
competence in engineering. Although theoretically feasible, in practice this is nearly
impossible or, at the very least, extremely costly. However, if environmental turbulence
or other exogenous factors push a firm towards a multihierarchical structure, enhancing
the competences of its organizational units may limit its drawbacks so far it concerns
information waste.
Let us consider duplication of operations as expressed by V . The hierarchy on the
left side of figure 2 does not duplicate any operation. The multihierarchy on the right
side of figure 2, if it is implemented with generalists at units (b) and (c), duplicates the
operation within the path z4 → h6 7→ k6 → h1 as well as the operation within the path
z5 → h6 7→ k6 → h1. Thus, in this case V ≡ v21. Finally, the multihierarchy on the right
side of figure 2, if it is implemented with multi-skilled specialists, does not duplicate
any operation.
In the case of the hierarchy, H = K = 6. In the case of the multihierarchy with
generalists, H = K = 4. In the case of the multihierarchy with multi-skilled specialists
H = 7 and K = 5. Equation (12) yields:
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VH = 0 (17)
VMHg =
1
16
(p264 p
2
16 + p
2
65 p
2
16) (18)
VMHs = 0 (19)
(20)
When comparing the hierarchy with the multihierarchy with generalists one ob-
serves that, since VMHg > VH , also from the point of view of operations duplication
there exists no endogenous drive to move to a multihierarchy. Eventually, an endoge-
nous drive exists in the opposite direction.
On the contrary, when comparing the hierarchy with the multihierarchy with multi-
skilled specialists one observes that, since VMHs = VH , from the point of view of oper-
ations duplication a firm should be indifferent between these two structures. However,
the multihierarchy is much more costly and difficult to implement than the hierarchy.
On the whole, we can interpret the empirically observed diffusion of multihierar-
chical structures as due to forces that are exogenous to the firm, whose negative effects
a firm attempts to counterbalance by multi-skilling its employees. To the extent that
this is achieved, the drawbacks of a multihierarchy can be (partially) offset and a firm
implementing this structure can be economically viable. This theoretical result may
shed some light on the emphasis on permanent education and job rotation that charac-
terizes many flexible organizations in the “knowledge-based” economy.
3.2 A Real Context
A real context may give an idea of the kind of situations where the above formalism
may be applied. The following example is to be meant as a sketchy introduction to
possible applications.
Oticon is a Danish producer of hearing aids that, after having been organized as
a functional hierarchy until the end of the 1980s, implemented such a radical restruc-
turing to be mentioned as a paramount example of a new emerging structure based on
flexibility and teamwork [27] [32]. Oticon’s restructuring actually concerned only its
headquarters, where R&D and strategic decisions were made; however, it was far more
radical than many re-organizations of research departments, or innovative flexible or-
ganizations in research-based firms such as those operating in the bio-tech industry.
Thus, the interest of the popular press is definitely justified.
In 1991, Oticon’s headquarters moved to a new location where open spaces sub-
stituted offices, informal communication substituted paperwork and hierarchy was re-
duced to two levels [22] [15]. Most importantly, employees were pruned to constitute
work teams on whatever project they thought it was worth pursuing — mostly research
projects, but there were also projects concerning internal organization as well as mar-
keting projects. The project on which a team decided to work had to be formally
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approved by a committee; however, in practice, the committee approved any project
and provided its leader with financial means to “hire” employees in the team. A sort
of internal labor market was created. Employees were encouraged to work in several
teams at the same time, in some teams as a member, in other teams as the leader. On
average, each of the 150 employees worked in 3− 4 teams. At any time, about 70
projects were active. Some projects lasted years, others where short-lived.
The reason for such a radical re-organizing was that, during the 1980s, Oticon
had lost substantial market shares to competitors who were better able at innovating,
notably exploiting digital technologies to build in-the-ear hearing aids. By allowing its
researchers to pursue whatever avenue they might conceive, Oticon was able to produce
a burst of innovations that quickly restored its market share [31] [37].
However, this extremely flexible structure did not last forever. The fact that any
project was allowed to start implied that enormous amounts of resources were wasted,
so after some time the CEO had to intervene to stop projects that were clearly unprof-
itable, a practice that was at odds with the declared management philosophy and which
generated obvious discontent [7]. In 1996, Oticon re-organized itself into a structure
where, albeit spontaneous formation of work teams was still possible, projects were
closely scrutinized before approval, only few of them were actually funded and the
internal labor market was abolished. Since 1996 Oticon employees participate on av-
erage to 1−2 different teams instead of 3−4, which amounts to dropping the number
of on-going projects from about 70 to about 30 3.
Whilst the 1991 re-organization was driven by market competition requiring greater
innovative capability, the re-organization of 1996 was an internal affair suggested by
the need to keep costs under control. Thus, Oticon’s story appears as a perfect example
of the logic followed in this paper, namely, that environmental unpredictability may
push organizations towards flexible structures but nevertheless, to the extent one fo-
cuses on endogenous factors, organizations have a natural tendency to move towards
more classical configurations. In the light of this framework, Oticon’s restructuring of
1991 appears as a correct but excessive response to environmental requirements, which
was subsequently curbed by the internal forces operating in the 1996 re-structuring.
The drawbacks of the extremely flexible organization adopted by Oticon from 1991
to 1995 can be easily understood in terms of information waste and duplication of
operations. In fact, the empirical literature ascribes the misfunctionings of this period
to the following factors [7]:
• Each employee was required to be proficient in several fields. In this way, fruitful
interactions with colleagues with quite a different backgrounds would be eased.
In the terms of our model, this translates into endowing organizational units with
multiple category strings and, possibly, to ascribe them the ability to choose one
out of several information strings to produce. However, this was apparently the
least serious problem in a high-tech firm such as Oticon, where all employees
had a high degree of education.
3This last figure derives from my own calculations on available data [7]. The ratio of 3.5 (median number
of participated teams from 1991 to 1996) to 1.5 (median number of participated teams since 1996) is 2.3. If
this ratio reflects into the average number of work teams, they must have passed from 70 in 1991-1996 to 30
since 1996, on average.
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• Since work teams competing with one another did not share information, they
eventually duplicated research efforts. Evidently, this is an instance of duplica-
tion of operations. Furthermore, all work teams engaged in internal politics for
approval by the CEO. This is also an instance of operations duplication, in the
sense that lobbying activities were duplicated across teams. Apparently, dupli-
cation of operations was definitely the most serious problem.
Unfortunately, no empirical study of the Oticon case recorded the birth, death and
composition of work teams, the problems that they were called to solve and the solu-
tions that they developed. However, we can speculate how a research could be carried
out if data were available.
Each single employee may be considered an organizational unit. Work teams are
temporary groupings of these units, wherein some operations are duplicated. For in-
stance, if all teams engage in internal politics in order to influence the CEO, then a
“political” sequence of operations is duplicated among all teams. However, sequences
of technical operations may be duplicated as well, for instance if several teams start
with the same idea (e.g. applying digital electronics to hearing aids), or just if a certain
technical process is required by otherwise different projects.
If a careful mapping of Oticon had been recorded, the Lyapunov functions U and V
could be computed. The available reports, stressing that duplication of operations was
the major problem [7], suggest that in the case of Oticon V may have been more impor-
tant than U . Since this function yields lower values when few operations are duplicated,
one may expect V to take a lower value after the 1996 restructuring than in the period
1991–95. Thus, it indicates the direction of endogenous change.
The Oticon example is interesting also because it suggests in what respect a cal-
culation of the extent of information waste and operations duplication might be useful
in management. In fact, the interpretation proposed herein suggests that Oticon’s 1991
restructuring was made because, although it was clear to everybody that more flexi-
bility was in order, nobody could know how much of it was really needed. In these
conditions, the wisest strategy was that of overshooting the target by means of a clearly
excessive level of flexibility, which would naturally decrease to its optimal level in sub-
sequent years — the 1995 restructuring. However, overshooting the target is costly, and
the more costly the higher managers overshoot. By comparing the extent of informa-
tion waste and operations duplication in alternative structural arrangements, a manager
would be able to assess the extent of flexibility with which her organization would be
endowed, and evaluate whether it is worth doing.
4 Theoretical Framing
This article presented a technical tool to assess certain structural properties of a firm.
Since no tool is neutral with respect to theory, it is in order to conclude by framing it
within the wider notion of the theory of the firm, which, as it stands, is split in two
streams.
One the one hand, the contractual stream initiated by Coase [6] views the firm as
arising because its transactions are more efficient than market transactions. This argu-
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ment has been further deepened by Williamson [40] [41], who ascribed the origin of
the inefficiency of market transactions to the possibility opportunistic behavior, which
is difficult to detect because of human bounded rationality. March and Simon also
wrote in the contractualist stream, though with a wider view [16]. According to March
and Simon, the network of contracts that constitutes a firm originates because bound-
edly rational decision-makers are unable to supervise an environment that is inherently
unpredictable, also — but not only — because of opportunistic behavior. By constitut-
ing a firm, the actors involved create a place where they enact their own (satisfycing)
thumb rules and cognitive maps of causes and effects.
On the other hand, the variably called “resource”, “competence”, “capability” or
“knowledge” -based stream originated by Penrose [26] views a firm as an institution
designed to develop and exploit specific competencies. Important developments within
this stream included the evolutionary theory of the firm, based on the relative invari-
ance of its routines [23], and the population ecology approach, which builds on routine
invariance to apply the mutation-and-selection mechanism to populations of firms [10].
More recently, through the work of Weick and Nooteboom a cognitive stream emerged
which understands “resources”, “competences”, “capabilities” or “knowledge” as de-
riving from psychic processes [39] [24] [25].
The cognitive trends in both the contractualist and the knowledge-based stream
are interesting because they may concur to build a bridge between opposing theo-
ries. In fact, the differences between the cognitive version of the contractualist stream
(March and Simon) and the cognitive version of the knowledge-based stream (Weick
and Nooteboom) are essentially a matter of looking at the firm bottom-up, i.e. start-
ing from the cognitive processes of its members, or top-down, i.e. starting from the
collective cognitive processes of the organization as a whole. However different these
approaches may be, they are not as inherently irreconcilable as the visions of Coase
and Penrose are.
The two measures presented in this article clearly concern menntal processes. In
fact, the first one focuses on information categorization, which is the fundamental
mechanism of cognition. The second one focuses on the exploration of novel sequences
of operations, which is a strategic action of a firm that seeks to cope with an unpre-
dictable environment. Thus, they are deeply embedded within the knowledge-based
view.
However, these measures also allow to see the contractualist view as a special case
that obtains when no information is wasted and no operations are duplicated. In fact,
the mathematical and computational models that have been developed within both the
knowledge-based and the contractualist views can be understood within the framework
of the Lyapunov functions presented herein.
The contractualist stream produced a series of models where the members of an
organization are viewed as information processors. These models succeeded to derive
alternative organizational structures from alternative configurations of costs of informa-
tion processing, costs of information communication and costs of specialization [28]
[30] [29] [4] [42] [43] [44]. All of these models can be thought as taking place at the
point where no information is wasted and no operations are duplicated, i.e., at the point
where the equilibrium described by the Lyapunov functions defined in this article has
been achieved.
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The knowledge-based stream produced fewer mathematical and computational mod-
els on the interplay between cognition and organizational structures. However, it is
interesting to remark that a series of models based on information categorization em-
ployes a formalism that is akin to that of the first of our Lyapunov functions [17] [18]
[19]. In the case of the knowledge-based stream, its models work at a point that is
distant from the equilibrium defined by our Lyapunov functions.
A conciliatory attitude is supported by the empirical evidence on the influence of
organizational structure on efficiency, which suggests that although the knowledge-
based approach has a larger explanatory power, both approaches are significant [13].
However, one should be aware that the consequences of a theoretical merger based on
considering cognitive processes may be much deeper than merely bridging two theo-
retical streams. In fact, cognition may imply social values, and in this case, contracts
may no longer depend solely on individuals’ preferences [21].
Finally, it should be remarked that the measures presented in this article imply that
managerial action is adaptive to exogeneous uncertainty, rather than proactive. Man-
agers have been assumed to dream of a predictable environment, and to take defensive
action if the environment is not so. This is certainly the case in most firms, but there
may be exceptions.
A Lyapunov Functions
A simple way to visualize stable equilibria is to think of a surface in a n+1-dimensional
space of n state variables, plus one variable for the height of this surface. Henceforth,
this surface will be also called a landscape. The n-dimensional space of the state
variables will be called state space.
The projection of a point of this surface on the n-dimensional state space represents
a state that a system can attain. Thus, the state of a system may be represented by the
position of a ball on the landscape.
According to one possible convention, the lower positions on the surface represent
the most preferred states. Thus, a system has a tendency to move from higher positions
to lower positions on the surface. Consequently, the bottom of valleys represent stable
equilibria. Conversely, the peak of mountains represent unstable equilibria.
According to the opposite convention, the upper positions on the surface represent
the most preferred states. Thus, a system has a tendency to move from lower positions
to upper positions on the surface. Consequently, the top of mountains represent stable
equilibria. Conversely, the bottom of valleys represent unstable equilibria.
Figure 3 illustrates one such surface in a case where n = 2. The state space is the
X −Y plane.
In physics, this landscape is called potential function. Physics makes the conven-
tion that the lower positions on this landscape represent the most preferred states.
For instance, if this landscape represents the gravitational potential of the earth, this
landscape coincides with the commonsense meaning of the word “landscape” with its
mountains and valleys and a tendency for a body on top of a mountain to roll down
to the bottom of the neighboring valley. Likewise, electrical potential describes the
tendency of electrons to move from the negative to the positive pole.
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Figure 3: A surface representing equilibria on a two-dimensional state space. Accord-
ing to one convention, the bottom of valleys represent stable equilibria. According to
the opposite convention, the top of mountains represent stable equilibria.
In biology this landscape is called tness function, or tness landscape. Biology
makes the opposite convention to physics: since organisms seek to improve their fit-
ness, the higher points on the surface are the preferred states. So the ball representing a
biological system has a tendency to climb mountains, mountain peaks are stable equi-
libria and the bottom of valleys are unstable equilibria.
Economics makes a similar point when it states that individuals seek to maximize
utility: in this case, the landscape is the social welfare function obtained by aggregating
individual utility functions. Similarly, firms maximize profits. Also in this case, the
effort of maximizing can be represented by climbing a peak.
The conventions employed in physics and respectively in biology and economics
are mathematically equivalent to one another. In fact, minimizing a function F is equiv-
alent to maximizing −F . Henceforth the convention will be used, that a function F has
to be minimized.
The potential functions of physics, the fitness functions of biology and the social
welfare functions of economics are Lyapunov functions. The Lyapunov theorem states
that, given a system described by state variables x1,x2, . . .xN , the origin of axes is a
stable equilibrium if:
1. ∃F(x) ∈ C o : F(0) = 0, F(x) > 0 around the origin;
2. ∂F∂x1 dx1 +
∂F
∂x2
dx2 + · · ·+ ∂F∂xN dxN < 0.
The Lyapunov theorem can be expressed with respect to the origin of axes without
any loss of generality. In fact, any point can be made the origin of the state space by
means of a linear transformation.
The Lyapunov theorem says that, if we succeed to find a basin-shaped function
such that the state of the system tends to move towards the lowest position, then that
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position is a stable equilibrium. Note that several Lyapunov functions may be defined
for a system.
Note also that the Lyapunov theorem provides a sufficient, but not a necessary
criterium for stability. Thus, if a Lyapunov function is found, we are certain that the
equilibrium is stable. However, if no Lyapunov function is found we cannot conclude
that an equilibrium is unstable, and not even that it is not an equilibrium point.
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